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 Starting with the man holding the card that read “I,” each 
stepped forward, closer to the table, turned to the side, then back to 
the front, and spoke. 
 “Shut up or I’ll cut you!  Hey, baby, how ya doing?  Your man’s 
over in Germany.  It’s been a long time.” 
 The words hit me like a punch to the stomach.  Hearing what 
that man had uttered to me, his face right above mine.  I had to 
make my mind split, the way it had that night.  I didn’t want to 
make eye contact with any of them, despite trying to look at each of 
them closely.  I concentrated on my job—to find him if he was 
here—even though my mind vividly replayed scenes as each man 
repeated the line. 
 Number four began his turn.  He had on a light yellow shirt and 
jeans.  A sudden shudder of recognition went through me.  Was this 
him? 
 Number five went, next.  When he said, “Shut up or I’ll kill 
you!”  I froze.  He and number four looked so much alike, so much 
like my attacker.  Why did he say, “I’ll kill you?”  I wondered.  Was 
it a trick?  He had on a brown and beige mock turtleneck and jeans. 
 The rest of the men finished.  I kept looking at numbers four and 
five.  I turned to Detective Gauldin, “It’s between four and five.  
Can I see them again?” I whispered. 
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 Number four repeated the procedure.  His facial features were so 
close, but his body didn’t seem right.  My rapist had been lankier. 
 “Shut up or I’ll cut you!” 
 Number five got it right this time.  I looked at his face.  He had a 
light mustache; his eyes looked cold.  His body was long and lean.  
He knew to wear brown, I thought, because he knew he had been 
wearing dark blue the night of my assault.  And he knew to wear his 
hair differently. 
 It was him.  There was no doubt in my mind.1 
 “Jennifer, do you see the man in the courtroom today who was in 
your apartment on the early morning hours of July 29, who had 
sexual intercourse with you, oral sex with you, and broke into your 
apartment?” 
 “Yes,” I answered, glaring at Ronald Cotton, who sat there 
expressionless, as if he didn’t care at all what had been done to me. 
 “Would you point to him?” 
 I raised my index finger and pointed directly to him, wishing I 
had had a gun instead and could get a clear shot at him, so I’d never 
have to see that face again. 
 “Let the record show that she has pointed to the defendant.  
Jennifer, are you absolutely sure that Ronald Junior Cotton is the 
man?” 
 How could I ever forget?  Didn’t they know his terrible face 
would stay in my mind forever? 
 “Yes,” I said.2 
hough Jennifer Thompson, the rape victim, spent more than 
forty-five minutes with her attacker in her brightly lit home, 
spoke to him face-to-face, and took special care during the attack to 
make careful observations and notes in her mind of all the attacker’s 
identifying characteristics, Ms. Thompson, a twenty-two-year-old 
college student, identified the wrong man in a photographic 
identification, in a lineup, and at trial.  She claimed to be “100% 
certain” of her identifications on all three occasions.  Indeed, when 
Ms. Thompson later observed her actual rapist face-to-face in a South 
Carolina courtroom after his confession and his DNA absolutely 
determined his guilt, Ms. Thompson stated that she had never seen 
him before in her life.  Mortified by her errors that caused Ronald 
Cotton to spend fourteen years in jail for a crime he did not commit, 
Ms. Thompson has joined Mr. Cotton in a nationwide crusade to 
 
1 JENNIFER THOMPSON-CANNINO ET AL., PICKING COTTON: OUR MEMOIR OF 
INJUSTICE AND REDEMPTION 36–37 (2009). 
2 Id. at 64. 
T
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change the way American state and federal courts handle eyewitness 
identification procedures.3 
All of the procedures in Cotton’s trial fully complied with the 
Supreme Court’s existing case law on the admission of eyewitness 
identification evidence. 
As Professor Medwed has written: 
The reason why eyewitness misidentifications are so prevalent 
generally stems from both (a) the imperfect manner in which human 
beings process visual information at the time of an event, and (b) 
the design of most police identification procedures, which can serve 
to reinforce, or exacerbate, any potential flaws in the original 
observation.4 
There are many processing explanations as to why eyewitnesses 
may make inaccurate identifications.  These include stress and fear 
along with several cognitive factors, such as the difficulty of 
identifying individuals from a different racial group (“cross-racial 
misidentification”) and inadvertently associating the perpetrator’s 
features with the features of someone more familiar to the eyewitness 
(“unconscious transference”).5  Though the vagaries of the manner in 
which observers process information has been well documented and 
concisely chronicled elsewhere,6 this Article focuses on the flaws in 
the police-initiated identification procedures and the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s flawed legal standard for the admissibility of the 
identifications generated by these procedures. 
It is time to change the law governing lineup eyewitness 
identification procedures and the admission at trial of eyewitness 
identifications.  Over the last forty years, forensic science has 
developed considerably while the law governing lineups has remained 
largely calcified.  The advent of DNA typing has underscored the 
unreliability of lineup identifications.  The authors of one study 
estimate that the convictions of seventy-five percent of those 
defendants exonerated through the use of DNA evidence were based 
on erroneous eyewitness testimony.7  The unreliability of eyewitness 
 
3 See generally id. at 276–91. 
4 Daniel S. Medwed, Anatomy of a Wrongful Conviction: Theoretical Implications and 
Practical Solutions, 51 VILL. L. REV. 337, 358 (2006). 
5 Id. at 358–59. 
6 See id. at 358–59 (explaining the factors involved in human processing). 
7 Gary L. Wells et al., From the Lab to the Police Station: A Successful Application of 
Eyewitness Research, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 581, 589 (2000); see also INNOCENCE 
PROJECT, REEVALUATING LINEUPS: WHY WITNESSES MAKE MISTAKES AND HOW TO 
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identifications is revealed most dramatically in sexual assault cases, 
which often include both victim identification testimony and physical 
evidence from which the assailant’s DNA can be determined.8  DNA 
evidence has also exonerated many defendants whose convictions for 
other crimes (some carrying a capital sentence) were based on flawed 
eyewitness identifications.  Improved lineup identification procedures 
and more stringent admissibility standards can help reduce the 
number of individuals wrongly convicted through erroneous 
eyewitness identification.9 
I 
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
From 1967 to 1977, the Supreme Court issued a series of rulings 
setting out the constitutional requirements governing lineups and the 
admissibility of eyewitness identification testimony.  Predictably, 
perhaps, the Warren Court expanded the rights of suspects while the 
Burger Court contracted them. 
In 1967, in United States v. Wade,10 the Warren Court, recognizing 
the risks created by suggestive lineups, held that after indictment 
there is a Sixth Amendment right to counsel during a lineup.11  The 
Wade Court observed that the presence of counsel at the lineup would 
 
REDUCE THE CHANCE OF A MISIDENTIFICATION 3–4 (2009) (noting that, in thirty-eight 
percent of misidentification cases, multiple eyewitnesses misidentified the same innocent 
person and that, in fifty percent of misidentification cases, eyewitness testimony was the 
central evidence relied upon by the prosecution). 
8 The wrongful rape conviction of Ronald Cotton—based on an erroneous victim 
identification—is described at What Jennifer Saw, FRONTLINE, www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages 
/frontline/shows/dna/cotton/summary.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2010).  After spending ten 
and a half years in a North Carolina prison, Cotton was exonerated through the use of 
DNA evidence.  Id.  Similarly, McKinley Cromedy spent six years in a New Jersey prison 
after being convicted of rape.  Ronald Smuthers, DNA Tests Free Man After 6 Years; Had 
Been Convicted in Rape of Student, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com 
/1999/12/15/nyregion/dna-tests-free-man-after-6-years-had-been-convicted-in-rape-of       
-student.html.  DNA evidence proved that the victim’s identification was wrong and that 
another man had committed the crime.  Id. 
9 Some inaccuracy in eyewitness identifications will persist because of the 
circumstances of the crime itself.  Scientists call these factors “estimator variables” and 
explain that they exist outside the control of criminal justice officials.  Brian L. Cutler, A 
Sample of Witness, Crime, and Perpetrator Characteristics Affecting Eyewitness 
Identification Accuracy, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 327, 328 (2006). 
10 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224–36 (1967). 
11 Though the lineup discussed in Wade happened to have taken place after Wade’s 
indictment, nothing in the Court’s reasoning would have limited the right to counsel to 
post-formal charge identification. 
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deter police from improperly influencing the eyewitness and would 
enhance the defendant’s ability to recreate the lineup at a suppression 
hearing and to cross-examine the eyewitness at trial.12  In the 
companion case of Gilbert v. California, the Court ruled that an out-
of-court identification would be excluded at trial unless the 
prosecution could show “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the 
identification was untainted by the uncounseled out-of-court 
identification.13 
In the companion decision of Stovall v. Denno,14 the Court held 
that due process requires the suppression at trial of identifications that 
courts deem necessary15 but “unduly suggestive” under a “totality of 
the circumstances” test.16  An unnecessarily suggestive lineup or 
showup identification would be per se excluded.17  A year later in a 
case involving a pretrial photographic lineup, the Court provided 
content and guidance to the totality assessment, stating that 
“convictions based on eyewitness identification at trial following a 
pretrial identification by photography will be set aside . . . only if the 
photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly 
suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of 
irreparable misidentification.”18 
In Simmons, the Court pointed out the dangers of police 
suggestions in the identification process and recognized the fact that 
“[r]egardless of how the initial misidentification comes about, the 
witness thereafter is apt to retain in his memory the image of the 
photograph rather than of the person actually seen, reducing the 
trustworthiness of subsequent lineup or courtroom identification.”19  
The Court found that the police procedures employed in the 
photographic identification of Simmons were not unfairly suggestive 
and should not be excluded, particularly in light of the extended and 
 
12 See id. at 228 (reasoning that confrontation between witnesses and the accused are 
riddled with many dangers that may seriously derogate from a fair trial.)  The court also 
pointed to the common occurrence of mistaken identification as support.  Id. 
13 Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 273–74 (1967). 
14 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). 
15 In Stovall, the Court found the suggestive identification, a showup, not to be 
“unnecessary” because the only surviving witness to a hold-up murder was lying on (what 
was expected to be) her deathbed in a New York hospital.  Id. at 301–02.  In fact, the 
witness, who was the widow of the victim, survived.  Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 273. 
18 Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968). 
19 Id. 
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clear opportunity the witnesses had to observe the defendant at the 
time of the crime.20 
The Burger Court seemed less concerned with the constitutionally 
dangerous implications of suggestive pretrial identification 
procedures and the resultant, increased likelihood of convicting the 
innocent.  First, in Kirby v. Illinois,21 the Court limited the Wade right 
to counsel to post-indictment lineups.  Given that the vast majority of 
lineups are conducted before the return of an indictment or the filing 
of formal charges, the Kirby Court’s elimination of counsel left the 
due process test as the only constitutional protection against most 
unfair identification procedures.22 
Then, in United States v. Ash, the Court ruled that there is no Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel during a photographic lineup, whether 
 
20 Id. 
21 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). 
22 In its discussion of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Supreme Court has 
gradually moved to a “formal charge” trigger in place of its historical emphasis on “critical 
stage” analysis.  In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967), the Court focused on 
a critical stage analysis in ruling that the defendant was entitled to counsel at a lineup that 
happened to have occurred after the indictment.  In Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 
(1972), the Court looked back on a long line of cases (starting with Powell v. Alabama, 
287 U.S. 45 (1932)) and presented a relatively vague standard requiring that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel attached at or after the time that adversary judicial 
proceedings had been initiated against the defendant.  Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688.  The Court 
then confirmed Wade’s extension of the right to counsel to pretrial critical stages.  Id. at 
690.  However, in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1972), the Court held that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel attached at the first appearance before a judicial officer at 
which the defendant was informed of the charges against him.  Id. at 398–99.  The Court 
reasoned that the formal charge trigger accounted for the right to counsel following the 
commencement of judicial proceedings against the defendant.  Id. at 398.  Similarly, in 
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986), the Court clarified the rule, holding that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel attached only following formal charges.  Id. at 431.  The 
Court supported this holding by reviewing two similar cases declaring the admissibility of 
evidence contingent on whether or not the defendant had been indicted.  Id.  The Court 
concluded that these previous holdings established the “formal charge” as the moment of 
attachment for Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  Id.  In McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 
171 (1991), the Court found “[t]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at the first 
formal proceeding against an accused,” and noted that “in most States . . . free counsel is 
made available at that time.”  Id. at 180–81.  Still, the standard remained somewhat 
unclear in subsequent cases.  In Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001), the Court affirmed 
the reasoning in McNeil and found that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached at 
or after the initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings whether by way of formal charge, 
preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.  Id. at 167–68.  Finally, in a 
recent case, the Court looked to further clarify the standard by holding that “a criminal 
defendant’s initial appearance before a judicial officer, where he learns the charge against 
him and his liberty is subject to restriction, marks the start of adversary judicial 
proceedings that trigger attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”  Rothgery 
v. Gillespie Cnty., Tex., 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2592 (2008). 
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conducted before or after indictment or formal charge.23  The Court 
based its rejection of counsel on a belief that presenting a witness 
with an array of photographs in the absence of both the defendant and 
counsel somehow provides “substantially fewer possibilities of 
impermissible suggestion” than a lineup attended by both the suspect 
and counsel.24  Common sense, of course, suggests the opposite 
conclusion.25  Given this purported unlikelihood of prejudice and the 
huge number of photo lineups, the Court found that requiring counsel 
at every lineup would place an unreasonable burden on the criminal 
justice system.26  In thus limiting or denying the right to counsel for 
most identification procedures, the Court reduced the due process test 
announced in Stovall to the only constitutional protection from unfair 
and suggestive lineups for the vast majority of criminal defendants. 
As for due process, in Neil v. Biggers, the Burger Court essentially 
overruled Stovall, holding that once a trial court found a lineup 
unnecessarily and impermissibly suggestive, due process required that 
a court apply a “totality of circumstances test” to demonstrate the 
reliability of the identification before admitting the identification at 
trial.27  The Court set out five factors that make up the totality of the 
circumstances: the witness’s opportunity to observe, the degree of 
attention paid by the witness, the accuracy of the witness’s initial 
description, the certainty of the witness’s lineup identification, and 
the length of time between the crime and the identification 
confrontation.28  The Court, however, deleted the term “unnecessarily 
suggestive” from the due process test, thereby placing its imprimatur 
on the admission of suggestive identifications even where the 
government chose, but was not forced by circumstance, to conduct a 
suggestive identification procedure.29  Finally, in Manson v. 
 
23 United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973). 
24 Id. at 324 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
25 In a rejection of some of the federal courts’ decisions, some argue that state courts 
should not rely on the formalistic reasoning of federal decisions and should instead 
incorporate psychological research findings that have followed the landmark decisions.  
See, e.g., Neil Colman McCabe, The Right to a Lawyer at a Lineup: Suppport From State 
Courts and Experimental Psychology, 22 IND. L. REV. 905, 907 (1989) (arguing against 
state courts’ following the Kirby and Ash decisions). 
26 See Ash, 413 U.S. at 310–11 (explaining that the realities of modern criminal 
prosecution limit the court’s ability to afford the Sixth Amendment protections to 
defendants at “critical stages” of the proceedings). 
27 Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972). 
28 Id. at 199–200. 
29 Id. at 198–99. 
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Brathwaite, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the Biggers five-prong 
test was required only when authorities had conducted an 
impermissibly suggestive lineup.30  The five prongs—henceforth 
known as the “Brathwaite factors”—are intended to ensure 
“reliability,” which, in the Brathwaite Court’s view, “is the linchpin 
in determining the admissibility of identification testimony.”31  Thus, 
after Biggers and Brathwaite, the Court would have the lower state 
and federal courts balance the degree of lineup suggestiveness against 
the five factors that the Court identified as those which could ensure 
reliability despite unnecessary and improper police suggestions. 
Thus, the validity of the Court’s announced “reliability” factors is 
crucial to determining the guilt or innocence of the criminal 
defendant.  If the reliability criteria are so faulty as to allow 
conviction of the innocent, then the Court’s own test fails functionally 
and fails to protect the defendant’s due process rights. 
II 
POST-BRATHWAITE FORENSIC SCIENCE 
In the thirty-two years since Brathwaite, forensic science has 
debunked the efficacy of the five-prong test as a measure of reliability 
and developed generally accepted techniques that minimize erroneous 
eyewitness identifications.  Unfortunately, the law has not kept pace. 
A.  Identification Procedures and Terminology 
Police principally employ two pretrial identification procedures: 
showups and lineups.  When police permit a witness to view a single 
suspect for possible identification, this is a “showup.”32  When police 
allow the witness to view several possible suspects, this is a “lineup” 
(which may also be a non-corporeal photo array).33 
The suggestiveness inherent in showups is obvious and well 
documented, clear to most juries, and requires no elaboration here.34  
 
30 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 108 (1977). 
31 Id. at 114. 
32 Amy Luria, Showup Identifications: A Comprehensive Overview of the Problems and 
a Discussion of Necessary Changes, 86 NEB. L. REV. 515, 515 (2008). 
33 Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures 
and the Supreme Court’s Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years Later, 
33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 1 (2008). 
34 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967); see also Luria, supra note 32, at 516; 
Nancy K. Mehrkens Steblay, Reforming Eyewitness Identification: Cautionary Lineup 
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Lineups are preferred because lineups are perceived to be fair to the 
accused.35  The manner in which the lineup is conducted, however, 
can greatly affect the procedure’s fairness and reliability.36 
Police have generally conducted lineups in the same manner for 
decades.37  Typically, the eyewitness is brought to a room where the 
lineup administrator and law enforcement officers are present.  Often 
these officers are involved in the investigation or arrest of the prime 
suspect, and the lineup administrator may even be heading the 
investigation.38  The witness is brought to a one-way mirror or 
window (thus reducing the possibility of intimidation).39  Those in the 
lineup who are not suspects are “fillers.”40  The police lead in a group 
of individuals—presumably of the same general physical type—so 
that the witness can view them all.41  Police then ask the witness if 
she is able to identify anyone in the lineup. 
In the traditional lineup, police allow the witness to view all the 
individuals—suspects and fillers—at once.  This procedure is known 
as a “simultaneous lineup.”42  If police allow the witness to view the 
individuals seriatim, this is a “sequential lineup.”43 
The lineup administrator traditionally knows the identity of the 
suspect.44  Accordingly, because there is only one “blind” 
participant—the eyewitness—this is known as a “non-double-blind” 
 
Instructions; Weighing the Advantages and Disadvantages of Show-Ups Versus Lineups, 4 
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 341, 349–50 (2006). 
35 See Michael R. Headley, Long on Substance, Short on Process: An Appeal for 
Process Long Overdue in Eyewitness Lineup Procedures, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 681, 683 
(2001–2002) (discussing the predominate use of lineups in American prosecutions). 
36 Steblay, supra note 34, at 341–43. 
37 Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification: Systemic Reforms, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 615, 
617–18 (2006) (describing the typical eyewitness lineup procedure). 
38 See Zack L. Winzeler, Whoa, Whoa, Whoa . . . One at a Time: Examining the 
Responses to the Illinois Study on Double-Blind Sequential Lineup Procedures, 2008 
UTAH L. REV. 1595, 1599 (2008) (describing police involvement in eyewitness 
identification lineup procedures). 
39 E.g., Taylor v. Kuhlmann, 36 F. Supp. 2d 534, 540 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). 
40 See Amy Klobuchar & Hilary Lindell Caligiuri, Protecting the Innocent/Convicting 
the Guilty: Hennepin County’s Pilot Project in Blind Sequential Eyewitness Identification, 
32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 11 (2005) (describing the most effective method of picking 
“fillers” for a lineup). 
41 See id. 
42 Suzannah B. Gambell, The Need to Revisit the Neil v. Biggers Factors: Suppressing 
Unreliable Eyewitness Identifications, 6 WYO. L. REV. 189, 194 (2006). 
43 Id. 
44 See id. at 195. 
 272 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89, 263 
lineup.45  If the administrator also does not know the identity of the 
suspect, the lineup is “double-blind.”46 
The manner in which a lineup is conducted can significantly affect 
its reliability.47  Obviously, if the fillers do not resemble the suspect, 
the witness will quite likely identify the suspect as his or her 
assailant.48  Studies have shown, however, that more subtle 
difficulties can undermine a lineup’s reliability.  For instance, when 
the suspect and the fillers have the same general appearance, the 
eyewitness is likely to select the individual that most closely 
resembles the general description that he or she has given to the 
police.49  This problem of “relative judgment” often causes 
misidentifications.50  Thus, when the actual perpetrator is not in the 
lineup,51 the witness is nonetheless likely to identify an innocent 
person because he most closely resembles the perpetrator.52  To 
minimize this difficulty, fillers should fit the witness’s initial 
description but should not share similarities beyond that description.53  
Additionally, studies have shown that this relative judgment problem 
is significantly mitigated when the witness views a sequential 
lineup.54  The sequential lineup gained prominence in 1985 when 
 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 See Dori Lynn Yob, Mistaken Identifications Cause Wrongful Convictions: New 
Jersey’s Lineup Guidelines Restore Hope, But Are They Enough?, 43 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 213, 219 (2002).  Scholars have identified “system variables” as those factors that 
criminal justice administrators can manipulate that may affect reliability.  Id.  Furthermore, 
scholars distinguish these factors from circumstances of the crime itself, which are outside 
the control of administrators.  Id. 
48 See id. at 224 (suggesting that, in ideal circumstances, the use of “mock witnesses” to 
test for lineup neutrality is recommended). 
49 Id. at 222. 
50 Gary L. Wells et al., The Selection of Distractors for Eyewitness Lineups, 78 J. 
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 835, 842–44 (1993). 
51 See Yob, supra note 47, at 226 (describing how some researchers suggest “blank 
lineups,” in which no suspect is present, in order to gauge a witness’s propensity to make 
relative judgments). 
52 Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: Psychological Research 
and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 765, 768–69 (1995). 
53 Wells et al., supra note 7, at 585. 
54 Wells & Seelau, supra note 52, at 772; see also Yob, supra note 47, at 217–18 
(describing how the “absolute judgment” used in sequential lineups, in which a witness 
compares the appearances of the suspect to their memory of the perpetrator, is preferred to 
relative judgment). 
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several researchers envisioned it as a potential solution to the problem 
of relative judgment.55 
Administrator bias—whether intended or not—also often 
compromises lineup reliability.  For instance, the administrator could 
inform the witness that the suspect may or may not be in the lineup.  
Studies dating back to the 1970s confirm that this instruction 
improves identification reliability.56  Studies confirm that not 
informing the witness that the suspect is in the lineup significantly 
decreases reliability.57 
Other examples of administrator bias abound.  If a witness is 
unable to make an identification after viewing a lineup that includes a 
suspect and fillers, the administrator may immediately conduct a 
second lineup that includes different fillers but the same suspect.58  
Similarly, when a witness identifies a filler, the administrator might 
say, “Are you sure?” or “No, try again.”59 
Any expression of approval by the administrator undermines lineup 
reliability.60  Researchers have discovered this “confidence 
malleability,” which can induce false confidence in an eyewitness 
even after she has made the identification.61  In the most obvious 
instance, the administrator will actually tell the witness she identified 
the suspect.62  Less obvious is the instance where a hesitant witness 
makes a tentative lineup identification of the prime suspect.  The 
administrator smiles and quickly ends the lineup, thanking the 
witness.  The witness will likely view this reaction as confirmation 
that she has made the correct choice.63  As a result, by the time of 
trial, a tentative lineup identification is likely to have become clear 
 
55 Wells et al., supra note 7, at 586. 
56 Id. at 585. 
57 Wells & Seelau, supra note 52, at 769; see also Yob, supra note 47, at 220–21 
(explaining that explicitly telling the witness that the suspect “may or may not be” in the 
lineup greatly increases accuracy). 
58 E.g., Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 441–42 (1969). 
59 See Melissa B. Russano et al., “Why Don’t You Take Another Look at Number 
Three?”: Investigator Knowledge and Its Effects on Eyewitness Confidence and 
Identification Decisions, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 355, 358–59 (2006) 
(outlining ways in which administrators may affect an eywitness’s identification). 
60 Id. at 361. 
61 Wells et al., supra note 7, at 586. 
62 INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 7 at 13. 
63 See id. (describing why confidence statements are not reliable indicators of accuracy). 
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and certain.64  Indeed, this is what happened in connection with a 
recent Missouri prosecution. 
 Eyewitness to a crime viewing a lineup: “Oh my god . . . I don’t 
know . . . It’s one of those two . . . but I don’t know.” 
 [The eyewitness continued to view the lineup for thirty minutes 
and then stated,] “I don’t know . . . number 2?” 
 Officer administering lineup: “Okay.” 
 Months later . . . at trial: “You were positive it was number two?  
It wasn’t a maybe?” 
 Answer from eyewitness: “There was no maybe about it . . . I 
was absolutely positive.”65 
Recent studies again confirm that giving a witness any positive 
feedback after she makes a lineup identification produces two 
significant results.66  First, it causes the witness subsequently to 
repeat the identification with greater certainty; and second, the 
witness is likely to remember her lineup identification as being 
considerably more certain than it in fact was.67  Thus, to promote 
reliability, scientists suggest recording the witness’s identification 
statement before the administrator offers feedback in any form.68  
This procedure will likely prevent a falsely inflated sense of 
confidence.69 
B.  Inadequacy of the Brathwaite Factors 
Analyzing the Brathwaite factors in the light of both traditional 
police lineup practices and the dramatic progress of forensic science 
confirms the need to eliminate the Brathwaite test. 
 
64 Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, “Good, You Identified the Suspect”: Feedback to 
Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 360, 360 (1998). 
65 Id. (quoting State v. Hutching, 927 S.W.2d 411 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)). 
66 Studies of “real world” situations have been limited, as many police departments 
have been reluctant to allow others to observe their lineup procedures.  Russano et al., 
supra note 59, at 374. 
67 Wells & Bradfield, supra note 64, at 362; Amy Bradfield Douglass & Nancy Steblay, 
Memory Distortion in Eyewitnesses: A Meta-Analysis of the Post-Identification Feedback 
Effect, 20 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 859, 864–66 (2006); see also Russano et al., 
supra note 59, at 364 (noting that administrator feedback can affect other factors such as 
how the witness remembers the quality of the view and the amount of attention she paid to 
the crime). 
68 Yob, supra note 47, at 225–26. 
69 Wells et al., supra note 7, at 586. 
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1.  Opportunity to Observe 
Traditionally, this factor was a function of the witness’s distance 
from the perpetrator, the angle of view, and the amount of time the 
witness had to observe.70  Studies have shown that distance and angle 
may be compromised by what scientists call “Visual Hindsight 
Illusion.”71  A witness with normal vision is unable to identify the 
facial features of a person at a distance of 150 feet.  If the witness 
thinks he knows the person—if, for instance, he believes it is 
someone he has seen before—he will probably remember facial 
features that he could not have seen from 150 feet.72  Although Visual 
Hindsight Illusion can obviously compromise the reliability of an 
eyewitness’s identification, the Brathwaite analysis does not account 
for it. 
Studies have also shown that witnesses—especially those in 
stressful situations—frequently overestimate the time they actually 
viewed the perpetrator and underestimate the time their view was 
obstructed.73  Even more significantly, other studies have shown that 
there is only a weak correlation between the length of time a witness 
views a perpetrator and the accuracy of that witness’s subsequent 
identification, thus again controverting a key part of the Brathwaite 
analysis.74 
Finally, it appears that in testifying to their observations, witnesses 
frequently improve the angle of their view, especially when they 
receive positive feedback from the police.75 
2.  Attention 
Contrary to the simplistic Brathwaite analysis, modern forensic 
science has confirmed that the relationship between the degree of 
attention a witness pays and the reliability of his subsequent 
identification is subtle and often unpredictable.  For instance, a 
 
70 Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 33, at 12–13. 
71 Id. at 13. 
72 Geoffrey R. Loftus & Erin M. Harley, Why Is It Easier to Identify Someone Close 
Than Far Away?, 12 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 43, 61–64 (2005). 
73 Gary L. Wells & Donna M. Murray, What Can Psychology Say About the Neil v. 
Biggers Criteria for Judging Eyewitness Identification Accuracy?, 68 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 347, 350 (1983). 
74 See Peter N. Shapiro & Steven Penrod, Meta-Analysis of Facial Identification 
Studies, 100 PSYCHOL. BULL. 139, 146–52 (1986). 
75 Wells & Murray, supra note 73, at 347–62. 
 276 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89, 263 
witness who did not pay close attention to a perpetrator’s particular 
facial features, but instead simply looked at the perpetrator’s face, is 
more likely to make an accurate lineup identification.76  Although a 
witness who concentrated on the perpetrator’s facial features is more 
likely to provide police with an accurate description of the 
perpetrator, he is also more likely to make an inaccurate lineup 
identification.77  Similarly, studies have shown that the more attention 
the witness pays to the details of the scene he is observing, the less 
detail he will remember about the perpetrator’s face.78  Stress may 
also reduce identification accuracy.79  Finally, studies confirm that if 
the assailant brandished a firearm, the witness is far less likely to 
provide an accurate description of that person because the witness’s 
attention was focused almost exclusively on the weapon.80 
3.  Description Accuracy 
There is no significant correlation between the accuracy of a 
witness’s initial description of the perpetrator and the accuracy of the 
witness’s subsequent lineup identification.81  Scientists believe that 
the two types of memory involved—recognition and recall 
recognition—account for this lack of correlation.82  Recognition 
relates to the ability of a witness to describe someone whom he has 
seen before in a rapid and uninvolved process; recall recognition 
relates only to a witness’s ability to identify what he has seen after an 
intentional retrieval stage requiring some effort.83 
 
76 K.E. Patterson & A.D Baddeley, When Face Recognition Fails, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOL.: HUM. LEARNING & MEMORY 406, 406–07 (1977). 
77 Id. at 407. 
78 See Gary L. Wells & Michael R. Leippe, How Do Triers of Fact Infer the Accuracy 
of Eyewitness Identifications? Using Memory for Peripheral Detail Can Be Misleading, 6 
J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 682, 684–86 (1981). 
79 Gambell, supra note 42, at 219. 
80 Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., Some Facts About “Weapon Focus,” 11 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 55, 55–62 (1987); see also Gambell, supra note 42, at 198 (describing that the 
stress and anxiety associated with “weapon focus” can lead to inaccuracy in eyewitness 
identifications). 
81 Gary L. Wells, Verbal Descriptions of Faces from Memory: Are They Diagnostic of 
Identification Accuracy?, 70 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 619, 623–25 (1985). 
82 A. Venter & D.A. Louw, Method of Questioning and the Accuracy of Eyewitness 
Testimony, 24 MED. & L. 61, 63 (2005). 
83 Id. at 63–64. 
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4.  Certainty 
Historically, some experts believed that there is a significant (but 
not overwhelming) correlation between the certainty and accuracy of 
a witness’s identification.84  Unfortunately, as has been discussed, 
because the certainty of lineup identifications is so often the result of 
police encouragement,85 the validity of that correlation is 
questionable.  In fact, the leading researchers have directly challenged 
the validity of eyewitness certainty as an indicator of accuracy.86 
5.  Delay 
The final Brathwaite factor is the delay between the witnessed 
event and the lineup identification.  The longer the delay, the more 
likely the witness will make an inaccurate lineup identification.87  
Significantly, several studies confirm that, the greater the delay, the 
more suggestible the witness is likely to become, thus increasing the 
probability of an inaccurate lineup identification.88  Moreover, as has 
been discussed, once a witness adopts the suggestion of a police 
officer or lineup administrator respecting a perpetrator’s appearance, 
the witness will likely hold firm to that description irrespective of 
delay, thus increasing the perceived certainty of his identification.89 
The “delay” factor is the only Brathwaite factor that has earned the 
approval of the social science community as relevant to reliability.  
Indeed, the research indicates that lengthy delay can interact with 
other identification issues, like suggestiveness, to harden the witness’s 
error.  It is noteworthy, however, that in Biggers itself, Justice Powell 
 
84 See, e.g., Siegfried Ludwig Sporer et al., Choosing, Confidence, and Accuracy: A 
Meta-Analysis of the Confidence Accuracy Relation in Eyewitness Identification Studies, 
118 PSYCH. BULL. 315, 315–27 (1995). 
85 See Yob, supra note 47, at 220. 
86 Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., Misguided Memories: Sincere Distortions of Reality, in 
CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENT 155, 170 (John C. Yuille ed., 1989); Gary L. Wells & Donna 
M. Murray, Eyewitness Confidence, in EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 155, 168–69 (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus eds., 1984); see also 
J.W. Shepard, Identification After Long Delays, in EVALUATING WITNESS EVIDENCE 173, 
185–86 (Sally M.A. Lloyd-Bostock & Brian R. Clifford eds., 1983). 
87 BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE 
EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW 105–06 (1995); see also Gambell, supra note 
42, at 198 (explaining the “forgetting curve” by which memory fades quickly soon after an 
event and then slows to a gradual fade). 
88 E.g., Elizabeth F. Loftus & Edith Greene, Warning: Even Memory for Faces May Be 
Contagious, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 323, 323–34 (1980). 
89 See Yob, supra note 47, at 225–26. 
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chose to ignore the significance of a seven-month delay between the 
commission of the crime and the lineup in deference to the fact that 
the identification did not fail the tests of the other four (now 
discredited) reliability factors.90 
Overall, many of the factors that affect reliability are 
counterintuitive.91  Thus, it is important that law enforcement 
officers, judges, and jurors have some understanding of the latest 
developments in the study of eyewitness identification. 
III 
REFORM EFFORTS 
A.  Proposed Federal Lineup Reforms 
In 1999, the Justice Department published a study authored by the 
National Institute of Justice: “Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law 
Enforcement.”92  This was the first time the federal government 
officially acknowledged the longstanding research on eyewitness 
identifications.93  The study included a discussion of recent cases in 
which eyewitnesses wrongly identified defendants who were 
subsequently exonerated through the use of DNA evidence.94  The 
DNA exonerations encouraged closer government consideration of 
the forensic work demonstrating the unreliability of eyewitness 
identification.95  The study included a description of the latest 
psychological research respecting eyewitness testimony.96  The 
authors recommended implementing many of the lineup reforms 
discussed here, including using fillers that resemble the suspect, 
keeping a detailed record of lineups, and instructing witnesses in a 
 
90 Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 201 (1972). 
91 Brian L. Cutler, A Sample of Witness, Crime, and Perpetrator Characteristics 
Affecting Eyewitness Identification Accuracy, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 327, 
338 (2006). 
92 NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT (1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf.  The 
drafting committee included government officials, social science researchers, law 
enforcement officials, defense lawyers, and prosecutors.  See Wells et al., supra note 7, at 
590 (providing detailed makeup of drafting committee). 
93 See id. (describing the process by which Attorney General Janet Reno became aware 
of social science research on eyewitness identification procedures and how she decided to 
initiate the DOJ report). 
94 NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 92, at iii. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 9. 
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non-suggestive manner.97  Perhaps most significantly, the authors 
recommended that police departments explore the feasibility of 
requiring double-blind, sequential lineups.98  The study did not, 
however, go so far as to require federal law enforcement to employ 
double-blind or sequential procedures.99 
Neither the Clinton nor Bush Justice Departments urged Congress 
to adopt any of these reforms.  It remains to be seen whether this will 
also hold true for the Obama Justice Department.  As of the time of 
this writing, there are no lineup reform proposals pending in 
Congress. 
B.  State Lineup Reforms—Executive Branch Action and Legislative 
Change 
In 2001, the New Jersey Attorney General required all state and 
local police to conduct only double-blind, sequential lineups.100  
Recognizing that this procedure might not always be possible, he 
agreed that, in limited instances, his office would continue to present 
in court traditional lineup identifications.101 
Although there have been no independent studies of the 
effectiveness of those reforms, it appears the police have not had 
significant difficulty implementing them.  As reported in a 2003 
survey, ninety-four percent of New Jersey law enforcement agencies 
indicated that they employ sequential lineups in virtually every case; 
seventy-seven percent indicated that they always use a blind lineup 
administrator.102 
Other states have reformed lineup procedures through legislation.  
In 2003, Illinois adopted new laws requiring police to photograph or 
 
97 Id. at 29, 32–33. 
98 Id. at 9. 
99 The scientists involved in the drafting of the report have expressed their 
disappointment that these requirements were not in the final report.  See Wells et al., supra 
note 7, at 594–95 (noting that, although law enforcement officials were receptive to these 
changes, the prosecutors involved in the drafting process opposed them). 
100 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., STATE OF N.J., ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES 
FOR PREPARING AND CONDUCTING PHOTO AND LIVE LINEUP IDENTIFICATION 
PROCEDURES 1–2 (2001), available at http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/photoid.pdf. 
101 Id. at 2. 
102 SHERI H. MECKLENBURG, ILL. STATE POLICE, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF 
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS: THE ILLINOIS PILOT PROGRAM ON SEQUENTIAL DOUBLE-BLIND 
IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES 13 (2006), available at http://www.chicagopolice.org 
/IL%20Pilot%20on%20Eyewitness%20ID.pdf. 
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record every lineup.103  In addition, Illinois law now requires police 
to inform witnesses at a lineup that the suspect may or may not be 
present.104  Finally, the law now requires Illinois police to use lineup 
fillers that resemble the prime suspect.105 
In 2005, Wisconsin required all law enforcement agencies to create 
written lineup procedure policies.106  The legislation was intended to 
“reduce the potential of erroneous identification”107 while affording 
individual police departments broad discretion in implementing the 
new policies.108  The legislation requires that local agencies consider 
model lineup legislation from other jurisdictions.109  The legislation 
also requires biennial evaluation of lineup procedures in light of 
advances in the science of eyewitness identification.110  Local 
agencies are thus encouraged to revise their procedures to reflect both 
their experience and the latest scholarship.111 
Virginia also promulgated new statutes governing lineups in 
2005.112  Henceforth, law enforcement agencies would develop 
model lineup procedures and reduce all lineup policies to writing.113  
These statutes also require law enforcement to maintain a 
photographic database of all lineups.114  The legislation did not 
impose any other requirements—like double-blind, sequential 
lineups—on local agencies.115 
In 2007, Maryland enacted a statute requiring that, by December 
2007, all police departments adopt written lineup policies that 
conform to Department of Justice eyewitness identification standards, 
and file those policies with the State Police by January 2008.116  
 
103 S. 472, 93d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2003). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Assemb. B. 648, 2005–2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2005). 
107 Id. 
108 Katherine R. Kruse, Instituting Innocence Reform: Wisconsin’s New Governance 
Experiment, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 645, 647–48 (2006). 
109 Id. at 686. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 H.R. 2632, Gen. Assemb., 2005 Sess. (Vir. 2005). 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Sandra Guerra Thompson, Why Do We Convict As Many Innocent People As We 
Do?: What Price Justice? The Importance of Costs to Eyewitness Identification Reform, 
41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 33, 62 (2008). 
116 H.R. 103, 2007 Leg., 422d Sess. (Md. 2007). 
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Although the Department of Justice’s report includes many 
suggestions,117 it does not require double-blind administration, 
sequential lineups, or videotaping.118  Thus, it appears that the costs 
that would be incurred with the statewide implementation of broad 
lineup reform caused the Maryland legislature to adopt more modest 
changes.119 
In 2007, West Virginia required all police conducting lineups to 
record the details of each lineup (i.e., the number of fillers and their 
resemblance to the prime suspect), all statements made by each lineup 
witness, and whether the lineup was double-blind and sequential.120  
More significantly, in 2007, West Virginia convened a task force to 
investigate the possibility of requiring that every lineup be double-
blind and sequential, and that police inform every lineup witness both 
that the suspect might not be in the lineup and that the witness need 
not make an identification because it is as important to exclude the 
innocent as it is to identify the guilty.121 
North Carolina has adopted the most wide-ranging lineup reforms.  
In 2007, North Carolina enacted statutes requiring that every lineup 
and photo array be composed of fillers whose appearance is similar to 
that of the prime suspect.122  More significantly, North Carolina 
police are required to conduct only sequential, double-blind 
lineups.123  The new statutes set out the alternative requirements of 
“neutral administration”—adopted by the North Carolina Criminal 
Justice Education Training Standards Commission—to be employed 
when an independent administrator is not available.124  For instance, 
if there is no neutral person available to conduct a photo array, the 
standards require use of a computer program that discloses photos to 
the witness in a random order unknown to the administrator.125  
Perhaps most significantly, failure to comply with these new lineup 
requirements renders the related identification inadmissible at trial.126 
 
117 NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 92, at 29–38. 
118 Thompson, supra note 115, at 42. 
119 Id. 
120 S. 82, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2007). 
121 Id. 
122 H.R. 1625, 2007 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2007). 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
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In a recent development, the Dallas Police Department has 
announced that it will implement double-blind, sequential 
procedures.127  A nation-leading fourteen DNA exonerations in 
Dallas County prompted the reform.128  Finally, many other states are 
considering reforming their lineup procedures: California,129 
Connecticut,130 Georgia,131 Hawaii,132 Maine,133 Massachusetts,134 
Michigan,135 Missouri,136 New Hampshire,137 New York,138 
 
127 INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 7, at 23. 
128 Id. 
129 As of 2006, California had proposed legislation on eyewitness identification reform.  
See S. 1544, 2005–2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006) (as amended on June 21, 2006), 
available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/sen/sb_1501-1550/sb_1544_bill 
_20060621_amended_asm.pdf (proposing reforms including double-blind procedures (§ 
3(a)(2)), the use of at least four fillers fitting the initial description (§ 3(a)(7)), sequential 
procedures (§ 3(a)(2)(A)), instruction informing the witness that the suspect is not 
necessarily in any of the lineups (§ 3(a)(3)(A)), and videotaping the lineup and witness 
statements (§ 3(a)(16)(H))). 
130 As of 2006, the most recent eyewitness identification reform bill in Connecticut had 
failed.  See Scott Ehlers, Eyewitness ID Reform Legislation (2005–2006)—32 Bills in 17 
States, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS (June 14, 2006), 
http://www.nacdl.org/sl_docs.nsf/freeform/EyeID_legislation. 
131 As of 2005, the most recent eyewitness identification reform bill in Georgia had 
failed.  See id. 
132 As of 2005, the most recent eyewitness identification reform bill in Hawaii had 
failed.  See id. 
133 As of 2005, the most recent eyewitness identification reform bill in Maine had 
failed.  See id. 
134 As of 2005, Massachusetts had several proposed pieces of legislation on eyewitness 
identification reform.  See, e.g., S.B. 913, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2005) (proposing 
reforms including double-blind procedures (§ 9(C)(1)), the use of fillers fitting the initial 
description (in a photographic lineup) (§ 10(ii)), sequential procedures (§ 9(C)(2)), 
instruction informing the witness that the suspect is not necessarily in any of the lineups (§ 
9(B)(iv)), and videotaping the lineup and witness statements (§ 9(C)(13))). 
135 As of 2006, Michigan had proposed legislation on eyewitness identification reform.  
See H.R. 5905, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2006) (proposing reforms including double-
blind procedures (§ 2(a)), the use of at least four fillers fitting the initial description (§ 
2(c), (e)), sequential procedures (§ 2(a)), instruction informing the witness that the suspect 
is not necessarily in any of the lineups (§ 2(b)(i)), and videotaping the lineup and witness 
statements (§ 2(n)(vii))). 
136 As of 2006, the most recent eyewitness identification reform bill in Missouri had 
failed.  See Ehlers, supra note 130. 
137 As of 2005, the most recent eyewitness identification reform bill in New Hampshire 
had failed.  See id. 
138 As of 2005, New York had several proposed pieces of legislation on eyewitness 
identification reform including A.B. 772, 228th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005) and A.B. 
3483, 228th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005).  See, e.g., N.Y. A.B. 772 (proposing reforms 
including the requirement that the administrator avoid providing information that may 
influence the eyewitness’s decision (§ 8(E)), the use of at least four fillers fitting the initial 
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Oregon,139 Rhode Island,140 Vermont,141 and the District of 
Columbia142 are all considering lineup reform legislation.  Whether 
these reforms are adopted may turn on how law enforcement has 
fared in those states with pilot lineup reform programs. 
C.  Pilot Programs 
In 2006, Minnesota and Illinois completed field studies of the 
effect that lineup reforms had on the reliability of eyewitness 
identifications.  To enhance the validity of the programs, they were 
implemented in both urban and suburban localities.143  The results 
were not altogether as expected.  The Minnesota Study confirmed that 
lineup reforms enhanced the reliability of eyewitness 
identifications.144  The Illinois Program suggested that the reforms 
were impractical and did not enhance reliability,145 but the program 
was seriously flawed.146 
 
description (§ 6(B), (D)), sequential procedures (§ 8(A)), instruction informing the witness 
that the suspect is not necessarily in any of the lineups (§ 2(B)), and videotaping the lineup 
and witness statements (§ 8(H))). 
139 As of 2003, the most recent eyewitness identification reform bill in Oregon had 
failed.  See Ehlers, supra note 130. 
140 As of 2006, Rhode Island had several eyewitness identification reform bills pending.  
See, e.g., H.R. 7069, Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2006) (proposing reforms including 
double-blind procedures (§ 12-7-22(a)(1)), sequential procedures (§ 12-7-22(a)(3)), 
instruction informing the witness that the suspect is not necessarily in any of the lineups (§ 
12-7-22(a)(2)), and a written record of the lineup and witness statements (§ 12-7-
22(a)(4))). 
141 As of 2005, the most recent eyewitness identification reform bill in Vermont had 
failed.  See Ehlers, supra note 130. 
142 As of 2008, the District of Columbia had one eyewitness identification reform bill 
pending.  See B. 17-841, 2008 Leg., (D.C. 2008) (proposing reforms including double-
blind procedures (§ 2(a)), the use of at least five fillers fitting the initial description (§ 
2(b)), the option for sequential procedures (§ 2(h)), instruction informing the witness that 
the suspect is not necessarily in any of the lineups (§ 2(h)(1)), and videotaping of the 
lineup and witness statements (§ 2(o))). 
143 Amy Klobuchar et al., Improving Eyewitness Identifications: Hennepin County’s 
Blind Sequential Lineup Pilot Project, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 381, 391 
(2006); MECKLENBURG, supra note 102, at ii. 
144 Klobuchar et al., supra note 143, at 404. 
145 MECKLENBURG, supra note 102, at iv–vi. 
146 GARY L. WELLS, COMMENTS ON THE MECKLENBURG REPORT, 4 (2006), available 
at http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/faculty/gwells/Illinois_Project_Wells_comments 
.pdf. 
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1.  Minnesota 
This study was conducted in the following Hennepin County Police 
Districts: Minneapolis (urban district with a population of 382,000), 
Bloomington (suburban district with a population 85,000), 
Minnetonka (suburban district with a population of 51,000), and New 
Hope (suburban district with a population of 21,000).147  In the words 
of the study: 
The Hennepin County Attorney’s Office pilot project focused on 
felony cases in four municipal police departments, including both 
stranger and familiar perpetrator lineups.  The cities chosen 
represent four levels of population and include both urban and 
suburban locales.  In Minneapolis, the largest of the four cities, the 
protocol was used exclusively by Central Investigations, which 
handles violent crimes.  Ultimately, the project involved 280 
lineups from 117 cases, representing 206 eyewitnesses over a 
twelve month period ending in November 2004.148 
The study required authorities to conduct only sequential, double-
blind lineups.149  The police used “property damage” officers to 
conduct lineups where the crime under investigation involved an 
assault or other human injury, and, conversely, when the crime under 
investigation involved property damage, the police used officers who 
customarily investigated assaultive offenses.150  Every effort was 
made to conduct lineups of six persons with fillers of appearance 
similar to the suspect.151  Police informed witnesses that the 
perpetrator might or might not be present and recorded each witness’s 
identification statement.152 
The Minnesota results were encouraging.  Compared to traditional 
lineups, the reformed lineups resulted in fewer incorrect 
identifications, comparable suspect identification rates, and more 
certain (i.e., less guess-prone) witness selections.153  Indeed, the rate 
of “jump out” identifications (i.e., immediate, certain identifications) 
remained the same, with ninety-nine percent accuracy.154  There were 
 
147 Klobuchar et al., supra note 143, at 383. 
148 Id. at 391. 
149 Id. at 393. 
150 Id. at 408. 
151 Id. at 393. 
152 Id. at 405. 
153 Id. at 411. 
154 Id. at 400. 
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fewer filler identifications.155  Accordingly, some scholars have 
concluded that the reformed lineup procedures “give us a clearer view 
of the truth.”156  Despite initial concerns, the police departments 
involved adapted to the new procedures and indicated they could 
implement the reforms permanently.157 
To enhance its validity, the study included a comparison of data 
from other jurisdictions and laboratory analyses.158  The primary 
criticism of the Minnesota Project is the failure to simultaneously 
conduct a traditional lineup survey in the same Hennepin County 
Police Districts.159 
2.  Illinois160 
Begun in 2004, the Illinois Pilot Program was implemented in 
Chicago, Evanston, and Joliet.161  Unlike Minnesota, Illinois required 
the contemporaneous comparison of double-blind, sequential lineups 
with traditional lineups.162  The results, released in 2006, greatly 
surprised the Program’s most vigorous proponents.  As one put it: 
“[T]he sequential, double-blind lineups, when compared with the 
simultaneous method, produced a higher rate of known false picks 
and a lower rate of ‘suspect picks.’”163 
Indeed, the results of the Illinois Program suggested that traditional 
lineup methods were uncannily accurate.  According to the study, 
traditional lineup methods resulted in accurate identifications one 
 
155 Id. at 395. 
156 Id. at 411. 
157 Id. at 406–07.  The most difficult logistical issue was the implementation of double-
blind procedures, especially in small police departments.  Id.  Still, within a short period, 
even the small departments were able to adjust and implement the new procedures with 
relatively little difficulty.  Id. 
158 Id. at 404. 
159 MECKLENBURG, supra note 102, at 16. 
160 The eyewitness identification reform followed a tumultuous time in Illinois history 
as Governor George Ryan outlawed the death penalty following a string of overturned 
capital convictions.  See Sharone Levy, Righting Illinois’ Wrongs: Suggestions for Reform 
and a Call for Abolition, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 469, 471–73 (2001) (detailing the series 
of events leading up to the abolition of the death penalty in Illinois); see also STATE OF 
ILL., REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT i–iii (2002), 
available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission_report/complete 
_report.pdf (describing the background for eyewitness identification procedure reform in 
Illinois). 
161 MECKLENBURG, supra note 102, at ii. 
162 Id. at iii. 
163 Id. at 7. 
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hundred percent of the time in Chicago and Evanston and 97.2% 
statewide.164  It is apparent, however, that the program’s flawed 
implementation accounts for these highly improbable results.165  For 
instance, in Chicago, the reformed lineup methods were implemented 
in the busiest police district.166  Officers placed more than one 
suspect in forty percent of the lineups even though a sequential lineup 
is most effective when only one suspect is used.167  When police 
conducted sequential lineups, they were invariably double-blind; 
simultaneous lineups never were.168  Police complained repeatedly 
that the need to find a neutral administrator caused intolerable delays, 
often resulting in witnesses threatening to leave the station before the 
lineups were conducted.169  Moreover, police officers unfamiliar with 
the kinds of crime under investigation were often assigned to conduct 
reformed lineups.170 
Although the report of the Illinois Study indicated that the 
“program’s protocols and forms . . . were reviewed and approved” by 
prominent experts,171 a number of those experts were harshly critical 
of the manner in which the program was implemented.  One expert 
noted that inaccurate results were inevitable when two entirely 
separate groups of officers were used: one group was instructed to 
apply only traditional lineup methods with which they were quite 
familiar, and a second was required to apply only methods that were 
entirely new to them.172 
In sum, given the flaws in implementing the Illinois Program and 
its unlikely conclusions (i.e., that traditional lineups were virtually 
one hundred percent accurate), experts have largely discounted its 
validity.173 
 
164 WELLS, supra note 146, at 3. 
165 See id. at 1 (explaining the shortcomings of the methodology of the Illinois study). 
166 MECKLENBURG, supra note 102, at 27. 
167 Id. at v. 
168 WELLS, supra note 146, at 1. 
169 MECKLENBURG, supra note 102, at v. 
170 Id. at 28. 
171 Id. at 32. 
172 See WELLS, supra note 146, at 4 (noting that the study had a major flaw in failing to 
include a simultaneous, double-blind condition and that this flaw prevents researchers 
from drawing clear conclusions from the results of the study). 
173 E.g., id. 
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IV 
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 
A.  Brathwaite Applied in State Courts 
Though the Supreme Court has failed to revisit the Brathwaite 
factors test in the forty years during which social science has 
debunked them as a test for reliability, under our federal system of 
government, however, a state court may interpret its state constitution 
to confer greater (but not lesser) rights than those conferred by the 
federal constitution.174  In applying Brathwaite, the highest courts of 
some forty states have declined to broaden its protections, their 
authority to do so under their own interpretations of their own due 
process clauses notwithstanding.175  The highest courts in the 
remaining states, or at least some judges, however, have found 
Brathwaite’s protections inadequate.  A review of these decisions is 
instructive. 
In People v. Adams, the New York Court of Appeals, applying the 
due process clause of its state constitution, held that henceforth all 
courts would exclude at trial the admission of any suggestive lineup 
identification.176  The Adams Court explained that: 
[T]he rule excluding improper pretrial identifications bears directly 
on guilt or innocence.  It is designed to reduce the risk that the 
wrong person will be convicted as a result of suggestive 
identification procedures employed by the police. 
 . . .  Permitting the prosecutor to introduce evidence of a 
suggestive pretrial identification can only increase the risks of 
convicting the innocent . . . .177 
Acknowledging Adams, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
has promulgated a similar per se rule of exclusion under the 
Massachusetts Constitution, reasoning that “[t]he ‘reliability test’ is 
unacceptable because it provides little or no protection from 
unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures, from mistaken 
identifications and, ultimately, from wrongful convictions.”178 
Although no other state court has adopted a similar per se rule of 
exclusion, several courts have ruled or suggested that their state 
 
174 E.g., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 300 (1982). 
175 Gambell, supra note 42, at 211. 
176 People v. Adams, 423 N.E.2d 379, 383 (N.Y. 1981). 
177 Id. at 383–84. 
178 Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1262 (Mass. 1995). 
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constitutions provide greater rights than those conferred by 
Brathwaite. 
For instance, in 2005, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the 
due process clause of the Wisconsin Constitution provided greater 
protections than those announced in Brathwaite.179  Accordingly, the 
court held that “evidence obtained from an out-of-court showup is 
inherently suggestive and will not be admissible unless . . . the 
procedure was necessary.”180  The court believed that in rejecting the 
Brathwaite factors, it was “return[ing] to the principles enunciated by 
the United States Supreme Court decisions in Stovall, Wade, and 
Gilbert.”181 
In 2006 and 2007, a member of the New Jersey Supreme Court 
opined that unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures violate 
the state constitution’s due process clause.182  The Utah Supreme 
Court, although not rejecting the Brathwaite factors outright, has 
altered them to include: 
(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the 
event; (2) the witness’s degree of attention to the actor at the time of 
the event; (3) the witness’s capacity to observe the event, including 
his or her mental acuity; (4) whether the witnesses identification 
was made spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or 
whether it was the product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the 
event being observed and the likelihood that the witness would 
perceive, remember and relate it correctly.  This last area includes 
such factors as whether the event was an ordinary one in the mind 
of the observer during the time it was observed, and whether the 
race of the actor was the same as the observer’s.183 
Significantly, the Ramirez court eliminated entirely the certainty 
factor—the factor that psychologists agree becomes the most 
 
179 State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 597 (Wis. 2005). 
180 Id. at 593–94. 
181 Id. at 597. 
182 State v. Herrera, 902 A.2d 177, 199 (N.J. 2006) (Albin, J., dissenting) (explaining 
that an emphasis on determining the reliability of the identification itself has distracted 
courts, under the federal approach, from the issues of unnecessarily suggestive procedures, 
mistaken identifications, and even wrongful convictions); see also State v. Romeo, 922 
A.2d 693, 706 (N.J. 2007) (Albin, J., concurring) (“Because we recognize that 
misidentifications are the single greatest cause of wrongful convictions, I believe that this 
Court has an obligation to discourage law enforcement from using highly suggestive 
identification techniques, such as showups, when there is no exigency.”). 
183 State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d. 774, 781 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Long, 721 P.2d 
483, 493 (Utah 1986)). 
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unreliable after the witness views a suggestive lineup.184  The Kansas 
Supreme Court agreed and, in 2003, adopted Ramirez.185 
Two state supreme courts have sought to reform eyewitness 
identification procedures through the use of strengthened cautionary 
instructions to the trial jury.  Acknowledging that certainty is the least 
reliable of the Brathwaite factors, the Georgia Supreme Court has 
ruled as follows: 
In light of the scientifically-documented lack of correlation between 
a witness’s certainty . . . and the accuracy of that identification . . . 
we can no longer endorse an instruction authorizing jurors to 
consider the witness’s certainty in his/her identification as a factor 
to be used in deciding the reliability of that identification.186 
The Connecticut Supreme Court has gone further, requiring juries 
to be informed of any suggestive pretrial identification.  “If, after 
considering the appropriate reliability factors, the trial court 
determines that the resulting identification is, nevertheless, reliable, 
the jury should be instructed that the identification procedure was 
unnecessarily suggestive, which could increase the likelihood of 
mistaken identification.”187 
Once again, however, social science has demonstrated what most 
lawyers already know or suspect: that limiting or cautionary 
instructions are an inadequate guardian of reliable evidence. 
B.  The Limitations of Limiting Instructions 
As noted above, one possible ameliorant to the vagaries of 
unreliable eyewitness identification is for the judge to provide the jury 
with a limiting instruction.  These instructions would warn juries 
about the dangers surrounding eyewitness identification and advise 
caution and scrutiny without the onerous task of introducing expert 
testimony.188  The U.S. Supreme Court has historically been 
optimistic in its view on the power of jury instruction, noting that an 
effective instruction will remove any influence of unspoken adverse 
 
184 Id. (citing Long, 721 P.2d at 490). 
185 State v. Hunt, 69 P.3d 571, 572 (Kan. 2003). 
186 Brodes v. State, 614 S.E.2d 766, 771 (Ga. 2005). 
187 State v. Ledbetter, 881 A.2d 290, 313 (Conn. 2005). 
188 See United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 314 (6th Cir. 2000) (expressing a 
preference for exclusion of expert testimony if the jury could receive the same information 
through effective cross examination). 
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inferences against a defendant.189  The Court has even gone so far as 
to say that “jury instructions suffice to exclude improper 
testimony.”190  The Court’s underlying assumption is that jurors 
follow limiting instructions in making decisions.191  Because large 
numbers of lawyers and some judges have long questioned the 
efficacy of cautionary instructions, in an effort to evaluate this claim, 
a large body of social science research has emerged on the 
effectiveness of limiting instructions to the jury. 
1.  Basic Findings 
At the heart of this issue is the fundamental question of whether 
people, specifically jurors, can truly disregard information after they 
hear it.  A significant body of research shows that jurors do not 
effectively ignore information after they are exposed to it, even with a 
limiting or cautionary instruction.192  In a surprising turn, other 
studies indicate that a judge’s limiting instructions or admonishment 
can have the opposite of their desired effect and cause jurors to 
increase their focus on inadmissible or questionable evidence.193  
This is commonly known as the “backfire effect.”194  To understand 
 
189 Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 298 (1981).  But see Krulewitch v. United States, 
336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (declaring that “[t]he naïve assumption 
that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury . . . all practicing 
lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction”). 
190 Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 191 (1987). 
191 Nancy Steblay et al., The Impact on Juror Verdits of Judicial Instruction to 
Disregard Inadmissable Evidence: A Meta-Analysis, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469, 470 
(2006). 
192 Rachel K. Cush & Jane Goodman Delahunty, The Influence of Limiting Instructions 
on Processing and Judgments of Emotionally Evocative Evidence, 13 PSYCHIATRY 
PSYCHOL. & L., 110, 113 (2006); Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie Arndt, Understanding the 
Limits of Limiting Instructions: Social Psychological Explanations for the Failures of 
Instructions to Disregard Pretrial Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence, 6 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 677, 680 (2000).  But see Cush & Delahunty, supra at 110 (explaining 
that limiting instructions may be more effective if a judge gives them before the end of the 
trial); Lieberman & Arndt, supra at 691 (noting that limiting instructions may be more 
effective when judges provide a nonlegal reason for exclusion, such as poor quality of an 
audio recording); Steblay et al., supra note 191, at 483 (summarizing that juror 
noncompliance with instructions is most likely when there is no explanation, when the 
exclusion is based on an unexplained technicality, or when the evidence is excludable 
because it was illegally obtained).  In contrast, studies have shown that instructions are 
more likely to be effective when the judge explains that inadmissible evidence is 
unreliable, hearsay, or irrelevant.  Steblay et al., supra note 191, at 483. 
193 Lieberman & Arndt, supra note 192, at 679, 691; Cush & Delahunty, supra note 
192, at 113. 
194 Lieberman & Arndt, supra note 192, at 677. 
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the general ineffectiveness of limiting instructions and the backfire 
effect, it is helpful to look more closely at some of the underlying 
data. 
2.  Possible Explanations for Why Limiting and Cautionary 
Instructions Are Ineffective 
There are a multitude of explanations for the ineffectiveness of 
limiting instructions.  The most straightforward theory is that jurors 
may simply fail to understand them.195  Another theory rests on the 
belief that jurors make their judgments according to what they feel is 
fair or correct.196  Some scholars refer to this juror tendency as 
“commonsense justice.”197  According to this theory, some jurors 
may fully understand the instructions but choose to disregard them in 
favor of the outcome they prefer.198 
Beyond these explanations, there are many more complex 
psychological hypotheses that may explain the ineffectiveness of 
limiting instructions.  One of the most prominent ideas, which also 
helps to explain the backfire effect, is “reactance theory.”199  
Reactance theory starts with the assumption that individuals seek to 
behave in “free behaviors.”200  A free behavior is “any behavior in 
which individuals feel that they have either the requisite physical or 
psychological ability to engage.”201  Research indicates that, when 
individuals perceive a threat to their ability to take part in a free 
behavior, the attractiveness of that behavior increases.202  A judge’s 
instruction to ignore certain evidence may fall into this category of 
threats.203  Thus, under the reactance theory, a juror receiving such an 
 
195 David R. Shaffer & Shannon R. Wheatman, Does Personality Influence Reactions to 
Judicial Instructions? Some Preliminary Findings and Possible Implications, 6 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 655, 659 (2000). 
196 Id.; Lieberman & Arndt, supra note 192, at 692–93. 
197 Shaffer & Wheatman, supra note 195. 
198 Lieberman & Arndt, supra note 192, at 692–93. 
199 Id. at 693. 
200 Id.  In this case, the free behavior is the ability to consider the inadmissible evidence 
as part of their decision-making process. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
203 Samuel R. Sommers & Saul M. Kassin, On the Many Impacts of Inadmissible 
Testimony: Selective Compliance, Need for Cognition, and the Overcorrection Bias, 27 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1368, 1369 (2001). 
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instruction may pay even more attention to the stricken evidence than 
he would have without the instruction.204 
The “belief perseverance,” theory posits that once a person forms a 
belief, it becomes difficult for him to change his mind.205  Thus, the 
normal sequence of a trial—during which the jury first hears evidence 
and is then instructed to disregard it—would limit the effectiveness of 
the instructions.206  “Hindsight bias” may also explain why limiting 
instructions are ineffective.  Under this broadly applicable theory, 
once the outcome of an event is known, individuals tend to 
overestimate the chance that the specific outcome would have 
occurred.207  Thus, a limiting instruction would not cause jurors to 
disregard evidence, even if inadmissible, if the evidence supported 
their conclusion respecting a defendant’s guilt.208 
General bias in the learning of information during a trial, and 
subsequent judgment based upon that information, may also help to 
explain why limiting instructions are ineffective.209  Few jurors, if 
any, are wholly unaffected by bias.210  A popular model provides four 
requirements to prevent bias from infecting judgment: (1) awareness 
of the bias, (2) motivation to correct for bias, (3) awareness of the 
direction and magnitude of the bias, and (4) the ability to adjust 
judgments correctly so that the bias is eliminated.211  Many jurors do 
not even pass the threshold requirement of realizing their biases.212  
Plainly, limiting instructions do not sufficiently address the effects of 
bias.213 
Finally, some scholars attribute the ineffectiveness of limiting 
instructions to “ironic mental processes.”214  Researchers note that 
any effort at mental control includes both an active, conscious process 
 
204 Id.  
205 Lieberman & Arndt, supra note 192, at 691. 
206 The jury would first form its belief about the reliability of any eyewitness testimony 
upon presentation of that testimony.  Under the “belief perseverance” theory, it would be 
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207 Lieberman & Arndt, supra note 192, at 692. 
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214 Lieberman & Arndt, supra note 192, at 699. 
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that screens for thoughts indicative of the desired mental state and an 
unconscious monitoring process that seeks to ensure that the 
individual is not thinking about the suppressed information.215  This 
process may prove to be exceedingly difficult in the context of a trial 
due to abundant information and the unfamiliar courtroom 
environment.216  The effort to suppress may also contribute to a 
backfire effect.217 
3.  Personality Issues 
Beyond general psychological phenomena, the individual 
personalities of jurors may help to explain the inadequacies of 
limiting instructions.  Several studies have focused on the issue of 
jury composition.218  One study established a “dogmatic scale” to 
correlate personality traits with likelihood to follow instructions.219  
Researchers rated participants based on their level of authoritarianism 
and dogmatism.220  Though its conclusions were tentative, the study 
underscored that each juror’s personality may compromise the 
effectiveness of limiting instructions.221  Additional studies have 
focused on other personality traits.222 
C.  Admissibility of Expert Eyewitness Testimony 
Given the inadequacy of the Brathwaite test and the 
counterintuitive nature of the reality of the eyewitness identification 
process, some courts have turned to the admission of expert testimony 
on the cognitive memory process and the vagaries of the identification 
process.  Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and its fifty state 
common law or statutory analogues all provide for the admission of 
expert opinion testimony where the factfinder (ordinarily a jury in a 
criminal case) “needs assistance” in understanding the evidence.  
 
215 Id. at 699–700. 
216 Id. at 701. 
217 Id. at 702. 
218 Shaffer & Wheatman, supra note 195, at 661. 
219 Id. at 661–62. 
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“dogmatisim” as a generalized form of authoritarianism, free of politically rightist 
ideology that characterizes high authoritarians.  Id. at 663. 
221 Id. at 674–75. 
222 See, e.g., Sommers & Kassin, supra note 203 (describing how the “need for 
cognition” personality trait may influence the effectiveness of limiting instructions). 
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Despite the rapid growth and general acceptance of eyewitness 
identification psychology in recent years,223 such expert testimony 
has received a decidedly mixed reception in federal and state 
courts.224 
An exhaustive review of state and federal opinions has found no 
ruling excluding expert psychological testimony on grounds of either 
“unreliability” in federal courts and most state courts or “lack of 
general acceptance” in the remaining state courts.225  Rather, the fault 
line for the admission or exclusion of eyewitness identification expert 
testimony is the determination of whether the jury does indeed require 
assistance in evaluating eyewitness identification testimony.  Those 
courts that admit the testimony have determined that juror experience 
and common sense are inadequate to reach the correct conclusion 
because of the counterintuitive nature of the reality of the 
identification process.  Those courts that decline admission have 
determined that jurors’ common sense would somehow include the 
understanding of the social scientist’s findings without the findings 
being brought to their attention. 
1.  Federal Courts 
There is a three-way split among the federal courts respecting the 
admissibility of expert eyewitness testimony.  Presumably the 
Supreme Court will eventually resolve these disagreements. 
a.  A Complete Bar to Expert Testimony 
The Eleventh Circuit alone has barred the admission of such 
testimony.226  In United States v. Smith, the defense sought to 
introduce expert testimony on three issues: (1) the lack of correlation 
between certainty and accuracy, (2) the weapon-focus effect, and (3) 
the impact of stress on memory.227  In deciding to bar this expert 
testimony, the court began with a Daubert analysis to determine 
 
223 See Wells et al., supra note 7, at 587–90 (explaining that the general acceptance of 
eyewitness identification psychology research occurred only after the proliferation of 
expert testimony on the subject, heightened media coverage, and prominent DNA 
exoneration cases). 
224 United States v. Smith, 148 Fed. Appx. 867, 871–72 (11th Cir. 2005). 
225 See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993); Frye v. 
United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
226 Smith, 148 Fed. Appx. at 871–72. 
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admissibility under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.228  
Under Daubert, the court must determine (1) whether the testimony is 
accepted within the scientific community and (2) whether the 
testimony will assist the trier of fact.229  The Eleventh Circuit had 
already held, in cases both before and after Daubert, that expert 
eyewitness testimony did not aid the jury.230  Accordingly, the Smith 
court adhered to this reasoning to affirm the lower court’s exclusion 
of the proffered testimony.231 
b.  A Case-by-Case Approach 
In United States v. Rincon, a Ninth Circuit case, a defense expert 
sought to testify as to how the following factors could impair the 
accuracy of eyewitness identification: the passage of time, stress, 
obstruction of view, certainty, and cross-racial identification.232  The 
district court excluded the testimony, reasoning that it would explain 
these factors in its trial jury instructions.233  The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed, holding that the proffered testimony was not accepted in the 
scientific community, and it “would not assist the trier of fact [but 
would] likely . . . mislead [it].”234  The Ninth Circuit emphasized that 
this was an individualized inquiry under Daubert and that there was 
no per se rule excluding expert eyewitness testimony.235  The Ninth 
Circuit has since acknowledged the current trend to admit such 
testimony as a matter of evidence law, not as a constitutional right.236  
The court thus ruled that exclusion of the expert eyewitness testimony 
did not result in a fundamentally unfair trial.237 
Similarly, in the Eighth Circuit case of United States v. Purham, 
the district court had excluded the testimony of a defense expert 
respecting potential for the inaccuracy in eyewitness 
identifications.238  In holding that this was within the trial judge’s 
discretion, the Eighth Circuit stated that the proferred testimony did 
 
228 Id. at 872. 
229 Id. 
230 Id. 
231 Id. 
232 United States v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 1994). 
233 Id. at 925–26. 
234 Id. at 926. 
235 Id. 
236 Gurry v. McDaniel, 149 Fed. Appx. 593, 594–95 (9th Cir. 2005). 
237 Id. at 594. 
238 United States v. Purham, 725 F.2d 450, 454 (8th Cir. 1984). 
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not materially add to the lay jury’s understanding of eyewitness 
identification.239  Moreover, in light of “the aura of reliability and 
trustworthiness that surrounds scientific evidence,” the jury was likely 
to give undue weight to the expert testimony.240  Other courts have 
held similarly.241  The First Circuit has set out the reasoning these 
courts have employed: 
“[W]e are unwilling to adopt a blanket rule that qualified expert 
testimony on eyewitness identification must routinely be admitted 
or excluded.”  Rather, we, and the district courts, should examine 
each case one by one, taking into account such concerns as “the 
reliability and helpfulness of the proposed expert testimony, the 
importance and the quality of the eyewitness evidence it addresses, 
and any threat of confusion, misleading of the jury, or unnecessary 
delay.”242 
c.  Courts’ Finding Expert Testimony Generally Admissible 
The Third Circuit first addressed the admissibility of expert 
eyewitness testimony in 1985, eight years before Daubert.  In United 
States v. Downing, the defendant was indicted for mail fraud, wire 
fraud, and interstate transportation of stolen property.243  The conduct 
in question was part of a broader scheme to defraud vendors at 
national trade shows.244  The scheme consisted of furnishing potential 
vendors with nonexistent references and then providing positive 
reports when the vendors attempted to contact the supposed 
references.245 
At trial, the main issue was the identification of a “Reverend 
Claymore,” who served as chief organizer of the fraudulent 
scheme.246  The government’s case primarily rested on eyewitness 
testimony.247  The witnesses had interacted with the defendant for 
 
239 Id. 
240 Id. 
241 See, e.g., Middleton v. United States, 401 A.2d 109, 131 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Smith v. 
United States, 389 A.2d 1356, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 
64, 81–82 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
242 United States v. Stokes, 388 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. 
Brien, 59 F.3d 274, 277 (1st Cir. 1995)). 
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varying periods of time ranging from five to forty-five minutes.248  
The defendant offered three arguments impugning the reliability of 
the eyewitness identification: (1) the short amount of time in which 
the witness had to view Claymore, (2) the innocuous circumstances of 
their meeting, and (3) the significant passage of time between the 
meetings and the subsequent identifications.249 
In an attempt to clarify the impact of these factors, defense counsel 
attempted to introduce the expert eyewitness identification testimony 
of then Temple University Assistant Professor of Psychology Robert 
D. Weisberg.250  The defense contended that Dr. Weisberg, who was 
a cognitive psychologist, could help the jury “deal with the problem 
of identification of the defendants” and could answer some 
hypothetical questions.251  The trial court excluded this testimony, 
reasoning that it would “usurp the function of the jury.”252  The court 
found significant that the government had introduced evidence in 
addition to identification testimony to establish the defendant’s 
guilt.253 
The reasoning offered by the Third Circuit in reversing is 
instructive.  The court noted (and the government conceded) that the 
prosecution was based on identification testimony alone.254  The 
court also noted that, under Rule 704 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, “testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise 
admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue 
to be decided by the trier of fact.”255 
In these circumstances, the court rejected the trial judge’s implicit 
suggestion that the expert testimony was inadmissible because it 
concerned “a matter of common experience that the jury is itself 
presumed to possess” under Rule 702.256  Rather, the court held that, 
because such evidence frequently runs counter to common 
experience, trial courts have the discretion to admit it.257  
Specifically, the court approved the approach of the Arizona Supreme 
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249 Id. at 1227–28. 
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Court in State v. Chapple,258 which ruled that it was error to exclude 
the defendant’s proffer of expert identification testimony where the 
expert would testify as to (1) “the forgetting curve” of memory; (2) 
stress’s producing inaccuracy and creating recall distortion; (3) “the 
assimilation factor,” which refers to the witness’s propensity to 
incorporate post-event information into her identifications; (4) the 
unconscious reinforcement that occurs when witnesses discuss their 
identifications with each other; and (5) the absence of any correlation 
between the witness’s expressed level of confidence in her 
identification and the factual accuracy of the identification.259 
Additionally, the liberal standard of admissibility that Rule 702 
establishes further convinced the court to remand the case for 
reconsideration of the admissibility of the testimony.260 
Over twenty years later, the Third Circuit revisited the 
admissibility of expert eyewitness testimony.  In United States v. 
Brownlee, the court held that, in light of recent studies showing the 
unreliability of eyewitness identifications, such testimony was 
admissible under Rule 702 and Daubert.261  In reversing Brownlee’s 
conviction, the court found significant that the trial judge had allowed 
only limited expert testimony even though the prosecution was based 
primarily on eyewitness identifications.262 
The Sixth Circuit has held that a criminal defendant has the right to 
a full Daubert hearing on the question of whether his proffered 
identification expert is qualified to offer an opinion at trial.263  At 
such a hearing, the trial court must weigh the helpfulness of the expert 
testimony against its potential to confuse the jury.264  The court 
should also consider whether the testimony would touch on the 
ultimate issue in the case, whether the prosecution had presented 
evidence in addition to the identification testimony, and whether the 
substance of the expert testimony could be imparted to the jury 
through effective cross-examination.265  The Smithers court found 
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that the district court should have conducted a full Daubert hearing to 
consider these issues.266 
2.  State Courts 
A number of state courts have held that the trial judge may not 
exclude defense expert identification testimony when the prosecution 
has based its case on uncorroborated eyewitness identification 
testimony.  The California Supreme Court held in People v. 
McDonald: 
When an eyewitness identification of the defendant is a key element 
of the prosecution’s case but is not substantially corroborated by 
evidence giving it independent reliability, and the defendant offers 
qualified expert testimony on specific psychological factors shown 
by the record that could have affected the accuracy of the 
identification but are not likely to be fully known to or understood 
by the jury, it will ordinarily be error to exclude that testimony.267 
The Arizona Supreme Court268 and the New York Court of 
Appeals have held similarly.269  Like the McDonald court, the 
Arizona and New York courts found significant that both 
prosecutions were based almost entirely on eyewitness identification 
testimony.270  Accordingly, both courts found the exclusion of expert 
eyewitness testimony to be an abuse of discretion.271 
In a recent development, the Utah Supreme Court similarly held 
that expert testimony is reliable in eyewitness cases where known 
factors affecting accuracy are present and, therefore, should be 
routinely admitted.272  In its analysis, the court highlighted scientific 
evidence showing that expert testimony is often the best way to 
educate jurors about eyewitness identification issues.273  The court 
concluded that such testimony met Utah’s evidentiary reliability 
requirement and that courts should not dismiss such evidence as an 
impermissible lecture to the jury.274 
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268 State v. Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208, 1222–24 (Ariz. 1983). 
269 People v. LeGrand, 867 N.E.2d 374, 380 (N.Y. 2007). 
270 Chapple, 600 P.2d at 1218; LeGrand, 867 N.E.2d at 379. 
271 Chapple, 600 P.2d at 1224; LeGrand, 867 N.E.2d at 380. 
272 State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103, 1112–14 (Utah 2009). 
273 Id. at 1108–11. 
274 Id. at 1112–14. 
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In 1995, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court barred the 
admission of expert identification testimony, reasoning that such 
evidence “intrude[s] upon the jury’s basic function of deciding 
credibility.”275  The defense had attempted to present expert 
testimony on the general psychological and behavioral patterns 
associated with eyewitness identification.276  The court held that 
expert testimony was admissible only where “formation of an opinion 
on a subject requires knowledge, information, or skill beyond that 
possessed by the ordinary juror.”277  The court believed that the 
expert’s air of authority would undermine the jury’s role in credibility 
determination.278  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has more 
recently declined to revisit the wisdom of that decision.279 
Few state courts have gone as far as the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court.  Rather, many have held that it is within the trial judge’s 
discretion to admit or exclude such expert testimony.280  Although the 
courts have not always offered the clearest guidance, they have 
generally reasoned (as the Downing court did in 1985281) that, the 
more significant the identification testimony is to the prosecutor’s 
case and the weaker the corroborative evidence, the less discretion the 
trial judge has to exclude the testimony of a defense identification 
expert.282 
CONCLUSION 
We end as we began.  Advances in forensic science over the last 
forty years have revealed the unreliability of traditional police 
identification procedures and demonstrated that the implementation of 
new procedures will enhance reliability.  This same research proves 
that the Supreme Court’s “reliability” factors, which are used to 
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approve admission of identification evidence, are seriously flawed 
and ineffective. Significant reform of lineup procedures will most 
likely come from legislative action.  As has been described, executive 
branch reform of lineups has been limited to the New Jersey Attorney 
General’s 2001 requirement that state and local police conduct only 
sequential, double-blind lineups.283  The unique structure of the New 
Jersey State government made such executive branch action possible.  
Under the New Jersey Constitution, all county prosecutors answer to 
the Attorney General.284  Because the Attorney General is ultimately 
responsible for all state court prosecutions, he or she can prohibit 
county prosecutors from using flawed lineup procedures.  In the great 
majority of states, however, the attorney general has no direct 
supervisory authority over local prosecutors who are independently 
elected.285  Accordingly, any order promulgated by those attorneys 
general respecting lineups would have an exceedingly limited effect. 
This is not the case with respect to the U.S. Attorney General, who 
has supervisory authority over all Department of Justice attorneys.286  
Unfortunately, no Attorney General has shown interest in lineup 
reforms since they were proposed in 1999. 
Significant lineup reform through judicial decree has been limited.  
As has been discussed, the great majority of state courts have declined 
to expand the Brathwaite protections.287  Although a number of 
circuits have suggested that the exclusion of expert eyewitness 
defense testimony might be reversible error, no federal court has 
suggested that due process requires the reform of the customary 
lineup procedures. 
Given the current makeup of the U.S. Supreme Court, including a 
number of Justices who have been quoted as proudly believing that 
the execution of an innocent person does not violate the federal due 
process clause,288 it is unlikely that the Court will revisit and alter the 
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present and demonstrably unreliable Brathwaite due process test.  The 
burden then falls primarily on the legislative branches of the state and 
federal governments and the highest state courts (through 
interpretations of their own constitutions). 
We recommend that state courts follow the reasoning of the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and the New York Court of 
Appeals in returning to the Stovall test, which bars the admission of 
any identification that is unnecessarily suggestive (e.g., a showup in 
an emergency situation).  In addition, this test allows the admission of 
other suggestive identifications only if the court is convinced by clear 
and convincing evidence that they and any resulting in-court 
identifications are reliable based on the scientific factors that provide 
real indicia of reliability.  Rather than focus exclusively on the 
inadequate Brathwaite factors, courts should insist (except in 
extraordinary circumstances) on (1) double-blind lineup or photo 
array procedures, (2) the use of at least five fillers who resemble the 
suspect to a reasonable degree (e.g., height, weight, race or skin tone, 
and hair), (3) sequential lineups or photo arrays, (4) informing the 
witness that the suspect is not necessarily in any of the lineups, and 
(5) videotaping the lineup and the witness’s statements during the 
lineup procedure.  In addition, state courts can and should require, 
under their state constitutions, the presence of defense counsel or 
some other person associated with the suspect at any lineup or photo 
array, irrespective of whether the identification procedure is 
conducted before or after the lodging of an indictment or other formal 
charge.  Finally, in order to fully inform jurors of the counterintuitive 
information surrounding the identification process, and given its 
general acceptance in the field of psychology, all courts should admit 
properly qualified expert testimony on the manner in which the mind 
processes identification information. 
More than fifty years ago, Professor Herbert Packer identified two 
contending bodies of thought regarding the criminal justice process: 
the Crime Control Model, which elevates the value of swiftness and 
certainty over procedural niceties, and the Due Process Model, which 
elevates principles of fairness over efficiency.289  Implicit in both 
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models is the reliable judicial separation of the guilty from the truly 
innocent.290  Nothing in our proposals should trouble even the most 
ardent Crime Control adherent unless he or she has abandoned the 
generally accepted notion that society is better served by models that, 
at their cores, seek to convict only the guilty and exonerate the 
innocent, so the actual malefactor can be caught and punished. 
 
290 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“I view the 
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a 
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man than to let a guilty man go free.”). 
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